what Mythen called a 'somewhat patchy historical appraisal', Beck's model suggests that pre-industrial, industrial and risk societies each possess a distinctive way of viewing and dealing with dangers (Mythen, 2005, p. 4) . While pre-industrial society adopted fatalistic attitudes to disasters by accepting ideas of divine providence or fate, industrial society offered prospects of real reductions in the dangers of disease or starvation by systematic prevention and new methods of economic production. But this growing technical competence increasingly produces 'manufactured' risks such as climate change which are, in fact, the by-product of economic progress. In the current phase of developed 'modernity', which Beck termed 'risk society', it is not clear that real risks have increased, but our fear of them, and our need for reassurance, have both intensified (Beck, 1992, pp. 55, 75-8) . This arises because there is a crisis in government decision-making, deriving from a combination of the incomplete recognition of global problems, an inability to design effective global responses, and a greater public awareness of these failures (Mythen, 2005, p. 5) .
The important argument here is that 'scientific government' has failed to deliver security, and has significantly relocated responsibility for risks to the individual, mirroring the individualisation which Beck sees both in the economy and the formation of identities (Engel and Strasser, 1998) . It would be too easy to accuse Beck of overgeneralising without any systematic evidence. Things have changed, in terms of our ability to counter traditional threats such as disease and starvation. Specific threats such as HIV are susceptible to a traditional, concentrated, scientific effort. Yet the global side effects of economic success are not as easy to deal with. In that sense, Beck is surely right to emphasise dangers on a global scale which are beyond the scope of the traditional individual nation state and its scientific expertise (O'Malley, 2009, pp. 1, 13) . Paradoxically, the declining status of science has occurred because modern cultures believe in the myths of scientific prediction and 'scientific' government. 'We crave certainty', and, says Beck, we become vengeful if experts fail (Beck, 2012, p. 78) . For example, a failure by an expert panel, the National Commission for the Forecast and Prevention of Major Risks, to predict accurately the 2009 Italian earthquake led to their prosecution for manslaughter. Their reassurances that conditions were 'normal', even 'favourable' were judged an act of criminal negligence leading to the deaths of more than 300 people in the city of L'Aquila (The Guardian, 2012a , 2012b .
What does seem clear from Beck's initial (1992) concept of risk, therefore, is that at its heart are the failures of the nation state to
